Abstract. For RSA, May showed a deterministic polynomial time equivalence of computing d to factoring N (= pq). On the other hand, Takagi showed a variant of RSA such that the decryption algorithm is faster than the standard RSA, where N = p r q while ed = 1 mod (p − 1)(q − 1). In this paper, we show that a deterministic polynomial time equivalence also holds in this variant. The coefficient matrix T to which LLL algorithm is applied is no longer lower triangular, and hence we develop a new technique to overcome this problem.
Introduction

Background
Is the key-recovery attack on RSA equivalent to factoring? This is one of the fundamental questions on RSA. Remember that in RSA, a public-key is N (= pq) and e, where p and q are large primes, and the secret-key is d, where ed = 1 mod (p − 1)(q − 1). Given (N, e), it is not easy to factor N from d while computing d is easy if factoring N is easy. More specifically, our problem is to find a deterministic polynomial time algorithm which can factor N on input the RSA parameter (N, e, d).
For this problem, there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm [12] based on the work by Miller [10] . Miller further proved that under the Extended Riemann's Hypothesis, there exists a deterministic polynomial time algorithm. However, it is a strong assumption.
At Crypto 2004, May showed the first deterministic polynomial time algorithm for this problem [9] for ed ≤ N 2 and |p| = |q|, where |x| denotes the bit length of x. Coron and May extended this result to unbalanced p and q [4] . These results mean that the key-recovery attack on RSA is deterministically equivalent to factoring as far as ed ≤ N 2 .
On the other hand, Takagi proposed a variant of RSA [13] such that N = p r q while ed ≡ 1 mod (p−1)(q −1). He observed that the decryption can be significantly faster in this variant. Hence it is important to study if there exists a deterministic polynomial time equivalence even in this variant.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we show a deterministic polynomial time equivalence between the key-recovery attack on Takagi's variant of RSA and factoring. More precisely, we show a deterministic polynomial time algorithm which can factor N (= p r q) from (N, e, d) such that ed ≡ 1 mod (p − 1)(q − 1) if ed ≤ N 4 r+1 , |p| = |q| and r = O(log log N ). It is interesting to see that May's result is obtained as a special case for r = 1. Hence, our result is a natural generalization of May [9] . Lenstra et al. developed an efficient lattice reduction algorithm known as LLL algorithm [8] . Based on it, Coppersmith showed a method of finding small roots of univariate modular polynomials [3] which was simplified by Howgrave-Graham [7] .
May [9] and Coron and May [4] used the simplified version of HowgraveGraham [7] to show the deterministic polynomial time equivalence on RSA. These methods first find a set of polynomials, and then apply the lattice reduction algorithm to the coefficient matrix T . It works well because T is lower triangular and hence it is easy to compute det T .
We use the same approach. One of main issues of using Coron-May's strategy in the case of Takagi's RSA is the fact that the matrix T is not triangular, which makes computing the determinant a problem. We overcome this problem by using another matrix M containing polynomials g(x, y), whereas the matrix T contains the polynomials t(x, y) = g(x + A, y + B). We prove that determinant of T is equal to that of M . We develop a new technique to prove it and believe that our new technique will be useful for many other lattice related problems.
Related Works
Boneh, Durfee and Howgrave-Graham studied how to factor N = p r q by using lattice reduction [2] . This type of composite N is very important since it is used in EPOC [11] and ESIGN [6] 3 in addition to Takagi's variant of RSA. They showed a deterministic algorithm of finding p in time O(p 2 r+1 ). They also proved that p can be recovered in polynomial time if we can find an integer P such that |P − p| < p r−1 r+1 . At Eurocrypt2005 [1] , Blömer and May proposed a general method of finding small roots of bivariate polynomials over integers, and improved Boneh et al.'s result.
Organization
The rest of paper is organized as follows. The next section contains the preliminaries. First, we review LLL algorithm and Howgrave-Graham's Lemma. Then we explain Takagi's variant of RSA and describe the motivation of this research. In section 3, we introduce and prove our main theorem. In particular, we show that the deterministic polynomial time equivalence holds for ed ≤ N 4 r+1 and r = O(log log N ). Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries
This section describes LLL algorithm, Howgrave-Graham's lemma and Takagi's variant of RSA.
Notation
For a vector b, ||b|| denotes the Euclidean norm of b. For a bivariate polynomial h(x, y) = h ij x i y j , define
That is, ||h(x, y)|| denotes the Euclidean norm of the vector which consists of coefficients of h(x, y).
LLL Algorithm and Howgrave-Graham's Lemma
Let M = {a ij } be a nonsingular w × w matrix of integers. 
LLL algorithm outputs a short vector in the lattice L. This algorithm works in deterministic polynomial time.
Proposition 1 (LLL [8] ). Let M = {a ij } be a nonsingular w×w matrix of integers. The rows of M generate a lattice L. Given M , LLL algorithm finds a vector b ∈ L such that
in polynomial time in (w, B), where B = max log 2 |a ij |.
Lemma 1 (Howgrave-Graham [7] ). Let h(x, y) ∈ Z Z[x, y] be a polynomial, which is a sum of at most w monomials. Let m be an integer. Suppose that
Then h(x 0 , y 0 ) = 0 holds over integers.
Takagi's Variant of RSA
Takagi proposed a variant of RSA such that N = p r q and showed that a faster decryption algorithm can be obtained [13, 14] . For example, for r = 2, it is 42% faster than the original RSA decryption algorithm.
Key Generation Generate two distinct primes p and q. Let N = p r q. Find e and d such that
Then, e and N are the encryption keys and d p , d q , p, q are the decryption keys.
Decryption Given a ciphertext C, do: 
Deterministic Polynomial Time Equivalence in Takagi's RSA
In this section, we show a deterministic polynomial time equivalence between the key recovery attack on Takagi's variant of RSA and factoring.
Main Theorem
We say that (r, N, e, d) is a Takagi's RSA parameter 4 if
We then present a deterministic polynomial time algorithm which can factor N = p r q on input such a parameter.
. Then we can factor N in deterministic polynomial time in (log N, 2 r ).
and r = O(log log N ). Then we can factor N in deterministic polynomial time in log N .
Proof (of Corollary 1).
Since r = O(log log N ), 2 r < (log N ) c for some constant c. Then the running time of the factoring algorithm given by Theorem 1 is bounded by a polynomial time in log N . Remark 1. Let r = 1 in Theorem 1. Then we obtain the following corollary: Given (N, e, d), N = pq can be factorized in deterministic polynomial time in log N if ed ≤ N 2 . This corollary coincides with the result of May [9] and Coron and May [4] for balanced p and q. Hence, our result is a natural generalization of their result on RSA.
Remark 2. In Takagi's variant of RSA, since ed = 1 mod (p − 1)(q − 1), e and d are usually chosen in such a way that e < (p − 1)(q − 1) and d < (p − 1)(q − 1). In this case, it holds that
Therefore, our bound is achieved for e and d that are chosen in the usual way.
Remark 3. The condition r < c log log N leads to another equivalent condition: r < c (log log p + log log log p) for some c . On the other hand, Boneh et al. proved that if r > c log p, N can be factorized in deterministic polynomial time of log N without the knowledge of d [2] . Consequently, the computational cost is not known when c (log log p + log log log p) < r < c log p. But, this is a purely mathematical interest.
Affine Transform Lemma
We now prove an elemental lemma which plays an important role in the proof of Theorem 1. We believe that this lemma will be useful for many other lattice related problems.
where α is an arbitrary constant. Let M = (g ij ) be the r × r coefficient matrix of g 1 (x), · · · g r (x), where
g ij x r−j , and let T = (t ij ) be the r × r coefficient matrix of t 1 (x), · · · t r (x), where
Then it holds that det T = det M.
Proof. It holds that
Therefore, we obtain that
Next, define an upper triangular r × r matrix A = (a ij ) as follows.
Then we can see that T = M A. Further, we have det A = 1 because
Proof of Theorem 1
We will factor N by using the following strategy. Let X, Y, m, t be positive integers which will be determined later.
Step 0 Let p = p 0 X + x 0 and q = q 0 Y + y 0 , where x 0 < X and y 0 < Y . Suppose that p 0 and q 0 are known, and we want to compute x 0 and y 0 .
Step 1 Construct a set of polynomials t ijk (x, y) such that
Step 2 Apply LLL algorithm to the coefficient matrix of {t ijk (x, y)} to obtain h(x, y), where h(x, y) is a non-zero integer combination of t ijk (x, y) with small coefficients.
Step 3 Let
We will find p 0 and q 0 by exhaustive search in Step 0. In what follows, we will show how to construct polynomials t ijk , how to compute the determinant of the coefficient matrix of {t ijk } and how to determine X, Y, m, t. It will be seen that the above algorithm runs in polynomial time in (log N, 2 r ) if max(p/X, q/Y ) is polynomially bounded because
Step 1 ∼ Step 3 are computed in polynomial time and p 0 and q 0 are bounded by max(p/X, q/Y ). Note that f (p, q) = (p − 1)(q − 1) is the modulus of Eq.(2). Let
Then it is easy to see that
for any (i, j, k). In g ijk (x, y), we will replace each occurrence of x r y by N because N = p r q (based on the Durfee-Nguyen technique [5] ). Therefore, the resulting g ijk (x, y) contains monomials of the form x a , y b and xy c 1 , x 2 y c 2 , . . . , x r−1 y c r−1 for some a, b, c 1 , . . . and c r−1 . Construct a list of polynomials G = (g ijk ) as follows, where s, t will be determined later.
append g 0,0,k and g 1,0,k into G in this order. for i = r − 1, · · · , 1, do; append g i,1,k to G. for i = 0, · · · , s, do; append g i,0,m to G. for j = 1, · · · , t, do;
for i = r − 1, · · · , 0, do; append g i,j,m to G. return G. 
It is easy to see that
We have now finished Step 1.
How to compute det T . Let M be the coefficient matrix of {g ijk (xX, yY )} and T be the coefficient matrix of {t ijk (xX, yY )}. Tables 1 and 2 show small examples. We want to apply Proposition 1 to T , where we need to know det T . However, computing det T is not easy because T is not lower triangular. (See from Table 1 .) This is the big difference from the previous works [4, 9] . We prove the following lemma based on Lemma 2. 
Proof. For 1 ≤ j ≤ m + t, define r polynomials f 1,j , · · · , f r,j of degree r − 1 as follows.
• f a,j (x) is the coefficient of y j in g r−a,j−m,m (xX, yY ) for 1 ≤ a ≤ r.
Similarly, define r polynomials e 1,j , · · · , e r,j of degree r − 1 as follows.
• e a,j (x) is the coefficient of y j in t r−a,1,j−1 (xX, yY ) for 1 ≤ a ≤ r − 1.
• e r,j (x) is the coefficient of y j in t 0,0,j (xX, yY ).
• e a,j (x) is the coefficient of y j in t r−a,j−m,m (xX, yY ) for 1 ≤ a ≤ r.
Let M j be the r × r coefficient matrix of f 1,j , · · · , f r,j , and T j be the r × r coefficient matrix of e 1,j , · · · , e r,j . For example, T 1 , M 1 , T 2 and M 2 of Table 1 and 2 are as follows.
From Eq. (5), we obtain that
Hence, it is easy to see that e i,j (x) = f i,j (x + p 0 ) because y j is the highest term in g r−a,1,j−1 (xX, yY ), g 0,0,j (xX, yY ) and g r−a,j−m,m (xX, yY ). Therefore, from Lemma 2, we obtain that det
Since M is a triangular matrix, we can compute det M easily as fol-
Applying LLL. Note that T and M are w × w matrices, where w = (r + 1)m + (s + 1) + rt = (r + 1)m + s + rt + 1.
Now by applying LLL algorithm to T , we can obtain
for some integers a ijk . From the definition of t ijk (x, y), it holds that
Therefore, if ||h(xX, yY )|| < S m / √ w, then from Howgrave-Graham's lemma, we have h(x 0 , y 0 ) = 0 over integers. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that
Since p and q are the same bit length, it satisfies that
, we obtain the following sufficient condition:
w(w−1)) .
How to determine X and Y By setting X = Y and s = t, det M can be simplified as
The dimension of the lattice is given as w = (r + 1)(m + s) + 1.
Since it holds that U ≤ N 4 r+1 from our assumption, we obtain
From inequalities (8) and (10) we obtain we can express inequality (11) as
The next thing to do is to find s which maximize γ(m, s; r) for a fixed m to maximize the bound X on x 0 . Such s is given by s = m. In this setting, γ(m, m; r) is calculated as follows. From the above discussion, we obtain
Total Computational time Taking the largest integer X of inequality (13), we obtain
By setting m = log N , we obtain
Hence, the number of repetition for selection of p 0 is upper bounded by a polynomial of 2 r . The dimension of the lattice is given by w = (r + 1)m + s + rt + 1 = 2(r + 1)m + 1 = O(log N ). The maximum entry of the lattice is given by N 4m r+1
+1 . This implies that the logarithm of the maximum entry is given by N ) 2 ) . Hence, the total computation cost for the bivariate polynomial h(x, y) is given by the polynomial of (log N, 2 r ). Note that LLL algorithm works deterministically.
The rest of our algorithm works in deterministic polynomial time of log N . From the above discussion, N can be factorized in deterministic polynomial time of log N and 2 r .
Concluding Remarks
We used the same approach as Coron-May [4] . But, Theorem 1 cannot be obtained trivially from [4] . We had to overcome the following two difficulties in order to prove our theorem.
1. How should we arrange the order of polynomials g ijk and monomials so that M is triangular? 2. How should we calculate det T ? Since T is not triangular, calculation of determinant seems difficult.
First, we explain how to overcome the first difficulty. In the analysis of standard RSA [4] , each occurrence of xy is replaced by N because N = pq. Hence only x a or y b appears in the resulting g i,j,k which makes it easy to form a triangular matrix.
On the other hand, we replace each occurrence of x r y by N because N = p r q in Takagi's RSA. Then the resulting g ijk (x, y) contains monomials of the form x a , y b and xy c 1 , x 2 y c 2 , . . . , x r−1 y c r−1 for some a, b, c 1 , . . . and c r−1 . A technical difficulty is how to make a triangular matrix M from these g i,j,k . We have given an efficient solution for this problem.
Remark 5. We can apply Blömer-May's method [1] to our problem. In this method, however, the lattice is uniquely determined by the Newton polygon of the target polynomial f (x, y), and hence there is no room for replacing x r y with N . Consequently we would get a smaller range of ed.
Next, we explain how to overcome the second difficulty. Since the only monomials x a and y b appear in Coron-May's g ijk , the matrix generated from t ijk is naturally triangular. Hence, in Coron-May's case, the determinant of T can be easily obtained. However, in our polynomials g ijk , the monomial x i y j appears. Hence, our matrix T cannot be triangular (for example, see Table 1 ). By showing Lemma 3 (that is det T = det M ), we overcome this problem. In the proof of Lemma 3, Lemma 2 plays an important role. Note that in proof of lemma 3, we did not use the property that M is triangular. We enjoy this property in calculating det M . We believe that our new technique will be useful for many other lattice related problems.
A Our matrix M is triangular
In this section, we describe the matrix M of Sec.3.2 more formally, and show that it is a lower triangular matrix.
We say that g i,j,k is the th polynomial of G if it is the th polynomial that is appended to G by the algorithm of Sec.3.2. For a monomial x a y b which is included in the th g i,j,k , we say that x a y b appears here first if it does not appear in the first ( −1) polynomials of G. Consider an expression of g i,j,k as follows.
-The leading monomial of g 0,0,k is y k for 1 ≤ k ≤ m.
-The leading monomial of g 1,0,k is x k+1 for 0 ≤ k ≤ m.
-The leading monomial of g r−i,1,k is x r−i y k+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1 and 0 ≤ k ≤ m − 1. -The leading monomial of g i,0,m is x i+m for 1 ≤ i ≤ s.
-The leading monomial of g 0,j,m is x j+m for 1 ≤ j ≤ t.
Lemma 9. In the th g i,j.k , all the monomials other than the leading one appears in some polynomial of G −1 .
Let M be a w × w matrix such that th row consists of the coefficients of the th g i,j,k of G, where the leading monomial of each g i,j,k is given as above. Then it is easy to see that M is a lower triangular matrix from the above lemmas.
The proofs of the lemmas will be given in the full version.
